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Abstract— Simulation has long been an essential part of
testing autonomous driving systems, but only recently has
simulation been useful for building and training self-driving
vehicles. Vehicle behavioural models are necessary to simulate
the interactions between robot cars. This paper proposed a new
method to formalize the lane-changing model in urban driving
scenarios. We define human incentives from different perspec-
tives, speed incentive, route change incentive, comfort incentive
and courtesy incentive etc. We applied a decision-theoretical
tool, called Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) to take
these incentive policies into account. The strategy of combi-
nation is according to different driving style which varies for
each driving. Thus a lane-changing decision selection algorithm
is proposed. Not only our method allow to vary the motivation
of lane-changing from purely egoistic desire to a more courtesy
concern, but also they can mimic drivers’ state, inattentive or
concentrate, which influences their driving Behaviour. We define
some cost functions and calibrate the parameters with different
scenarios traffic data. Distinguishing driving styles are used to
aggregate decision-makers’ assessments about various criteria
weightings to obtain the action drivers desire most. Our result
demonstrates the proposed method can produce varied lane-
changing behaviour. Unlike other lane-changing models based
on artificial intelligence methods, our model has a more flexible
controllability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Lane-changing models are a vital component in au-
tonomous driving simulation tools, which are extensively
used and playing an increasingly important role in behaviour
studies. With the rise of autonomous driving research, the
demand for establishing car behaviour model in simulators
[1] [2] in this area has increased. Furthermore, microscopic
traffic models can be used together in simulator to create
virtual scenarios in which the lane-changing model is an
essential component for replicating real-world individuals be-
haviours. As car-following model can simplify the kinematic
model and mimic the longitudinal motion along the lane
in simulator, lane-changing model are supposed to produce
variant intention towards to lane-changing decisions.
Lane-changing model has been developed since 1960s,
they could be classified into several types: rule-based,
discrete choice model, Artificial Intelligence model and
incentive-based model [3]. MOBIL [4] is a classical
incentive-based model which takes the safety and accel-
eration into account, this attribute makes it only suitable
for highway scenarios. However, lane-changing behavior in
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urban scenarios is much more complex to evaluate due to the
complicated driver style and environmental impacts, such as
the driver’s age, sex, career, character and some factors of
the roadway, which have not been adequately considered in
existing models. We proposed to evaluate the lane-changing
probability by combining the driving style and incentives
In this paper, a more comprehensive and macroscopic lane-
changing model is proposed for simulating urban driving
behaviours. Some possible lane-changing incentives, com-
fort, route, speed and courtesy, are discussed and formulated
mathematically by evaluation function. A multiple-criteria
decision making method is used to integrate these factors
together to improve the accuracy and reliability. Different
driving styles are integrated into our model. These distin-
guishing styles could be used to tune weights in the evalu-
ation of lane-changing desire. All parameters are calibrated
in our simulator by traffic data via different scenarios, high
way and urban. And the tuning of parameters can produce
abundant and unexpected lane-changing behaviours, which
demonstrates the flexible and versatile feature of our model.
II. RELATED WORK
In the past, lane-changing model is well studied in dif-
ferent perspectives. Ahmed presented in 1999 a utility-
based framework which divides lane-changing maneuvers
into mandatory (MLC) and discretionary (DLC) and adopts
a decision three to model a lane-changing maneuver[5].
Another lane-changing model that focused on interactions
between a merging vehicle and through vehicles in an on-
ramp location is Kitas model[5]. Some of the recent emerged
lane-changing models use artificial intelligence methods to
make lane-changing decision, such as randomized forest[6]
or layered perceptron [7]. Deep learning-based decision
making methods are widely studied in recent years, the
method can produce abundant and reasonable result. But
drivers’ decision is highly related to their driving style, we
can hardly modify their models’ parameters to mimic the
specific driving styles because of the uncontrollability of DL
model.
Incentives of lane-changing are complex and have been
studied for a long time. [4] formulated a lane change model
combined with incentives to safety and minimize brake cost.
[8] proposed a incentive-based model which combined three
main aspects, follow a route, to gain speed, and to keep right,
for determining a lane change desire.
Driving style is also studied in different perspective. It can
affect any action during the cruise and its classification are
also various. The extent of aggressiveness can be divided as
cautious, stable or adventitious. In terms of the interaction
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of others, they can be divided as egoism vs altruism. Altru-
ists are polite drivers who consider more others’ interests.
Additionally, drivers could be inattentive due to distraction
or fatigue [9].
A. Car-following models review
As lane-changing model is in the level of decision-making,
a dynamic kinematic model should be integrated to describe
the longitudinal motion of vehicles. Thus car-following mod-
els will be discussed in this section. In the past a variety
of car-following models were established, They are derived
from different perspectives and are suitable in different traffic
situation. Next, we mainly introduce the two families of the
car-following model.
1) OVM: Optimal velocity model is proposed by [10],
this model uses a optimal velocity determined by the inter-
vehicle distance to present drivers’ velocity anticipation.
This Optimal Velocity Model describes the following fea-
tures,
• A car will keep the maximum speed with enough the
distance to the next car.
• A car tries to run with optimal velocity determined by
the distance to the next car.
These features make it suitable for adventitious drivers
who dare to keep an optimal velocity to reduce their driving
time. But this model encounters the problems of too high
acceleration and unrealistic deceleration. In order to solve
the problems, Generalized forces model [11](GFM) was
proposed. It inherits the optimal velocity concept from OVM
and is also derived from the pedestrian Social forced model.
It proposed the virutal social forces concept into the traffic
network. Each car is influenced by repulsive and attractive
forces. Full Velocity Difference model (FVDM) [12] is an
enhance GFM, it takes both positive and negative velocity
differences with the precedent car into account. The main
advantage of FVDM is eliminating unrealistically high ac-
celeration and predicts a correct delay time of car motion and
kinematic wave speed at jam density. However, the velocity
difference is not enough to avoid an accident under an urgent
case.
2) IDM: The intelligent driver model (IDM) is a time-
continuous car-following model for the simulation of freeway
and urban traffic. It was developed by [13] and is a avoidance
of collision model cause it takes safe time headway into
count and delimiting unrealistic acceleration and decelera-
tion. The non-avoidance feature makes IDM a conservative
driving behaviour model. [14] proposed an enhanced IDM
to eliminate some unrealistic behaviour in lane-changing in
congested traffic.
Different car-following models could produce different
resulting accelerations and velocity in similar situation due
to their own characteristics. Thus they can be used to fit
different driving styles as an underlying model with our lane-
changing model.
III. MULTIPLE INCENTIVES DECISION ANALYSIS
Incentives could be view as the basic elements in decision-
making in sociology, economics and engineering etc. People
have different criterias and responses for a same incentive.
In classic MOBIL[4] model, the acceleration incentive
criterion measures the attractiveness of a given lane based
on its utility, and the safety criterion measures the risk
associated with lane changing (i.e., acceleration). They have
a hierarchy as acceleration incentive is firstly considered.
In practice, we have more macroscopic and long-term
incentives to drive us make a lane-changing decision. In
our method, safety criteria is regarded as a low-level con-
dition we should pay attention while we are executing lane-
changing behaviour. Some other more high-level motivations,
such as velocity, acceleration gain and the pursuit of comfort
are developed and combined by MCDM.
Most of people prefer to choose their custom route in daily
life. But sometimes they tend to change to a a less congested
route to avoid traffic. The travel time of each route are
accessible via the navigation system in our car. depends not
only on traffic guidance system. We may sometimes choose
to not follow the recommended routing path in navigation
app for an avoidance of a traffic jam. Someone tired may
prefer to keep the original route because a lane-changing
progress costs drivers’ too much attention, they will be forced
to notice carefully the feasible gap and vehicles’ speed and
synchronized with the velocity of target lane. Even they are
involved into a game theory with other driver because they
have to estimate other drivers intention(yield or not yield)
while they are try to merge. Thus drives who are tired or
care little about the time cost, they often regard the driving
as a relaxation and hardly like to be nervous.
We assume that the drivers in transportation system are
bounded rational , they make decision according they driving
styles. And the traffic information they received is incom-
plete. Besides the navigation system can provide route travel
time, people can only use the surrounding situation in their
sight to estimate the whole community traffic.
Mandatory lane-changing decision may disable the incen-
tive policy. In our studies we eliminate mandatory lane-
changing. Everyone take lane-changing action as voluntary
desire. In our method, we can generate agent with different
characters by varying the parameters of driving style so that
each agent can use their own values to judge whether it is
worthwhile to change lanes.
IV. POLICIES
In community-size driving scenarios, each lane may led to
different road section in the intersection. If the current route
cannot be followed any more on the target lane. Thus people
change to the lane next to lane may bring them a result that
they cannot get back timely. The adjacent and parallel lanes
which led consequently to the same section can be viewed
as symmetric lanes. The lane-changing behaviour between
symmetric lanes can be simplified as a pure velocity gain
incentives as MOBIL does. But change to a asymmetric lane
Fig. 1. Illustration of symmetric vs asymmetric lane. Lane B leads to both
left and straight forward, thus B are symmetric for Lane A and Lane C. But
A and C are asymmetric for each other, additionally for B, they are both
asymmetric.
may involved more incentives such as change of routing path
or overtaking some precedent cars.
In the figure, the lane b and c have the same following
section, thus they are symmetric. The lane change-behaviour
between these two lanes only involves the acceleration or
velocity gain. Once people drive into lane a might bring
them into a new routing path.
A. Probability of back
The difficulty of changing lanes is positively related to
the traffic density of the target lane. If the target lane
is almost vacuum, the degree of difficulty tend to be 0.
In this case, drivers more likely tend to change lane to
overtake the precedent car, they definitely could change back
to the original route before they reach the stop line or
off-ramp. Plus, drivers have more chance to change back
if the remaining distance is long enough. In other words,
people take a risk of route change if they change lane to
an asymmetric lane unless they determine to change their
original route to avoid traffic congestion. Thus a routing path
change behavior may lead to a lane change action, vice versa.
We propose a parameter Pb that indicates the probability if
the drivers can change back. If they change back to their
original lane, the double changing behaviour can be viewed
as a overtaking. If not, the driver may be voluntary or forced
to take a new routing path.
This probability is related to average gap distance and
vehicles velocity in the target lane. The average of time
headway :
Th =
d¯
v¯
where the d¯ is the mean headway in this lane. And more long
length the parallel roads have, the more chance drivers will
have to back. Then we can define an equation that indicate
the probability of back to the original lane.
P = 1− e−α∗Th∗S
where Th is the average of time headway and S is the
remaining distance.
B. Route change incentive
People normally has a desire to keep in shortest routing
path. But sometimes while a driving in a hurry meets traffic
jam in ego lane, he might decides to change other routing
path to avoid this.
Traffic condition is always complicated and uncertain, and
the travelers cannot accurately perceive the current or future
traffic conditions. Thus, drivers make their route choice
decisions under risk and uncertainty. As all vehicles equipped
a navigation system, drivers have a rough estimation of all
possible paths and choose their desired path instead of the
shortest path.
In other aspect, as we discussed in the previous section,
people change lane may result finally a change of routing
path cause they cannot change back timely. In order to resist
this current risk, the potential path should be put in drivers’
mind. For example, if people miss an exit on the highway,
they may have to get some kilometers more to reach the
destination. In this case, we should give a huge penalty.
Routing cost can be qualified by the length of route, the
number of turns and number of traffic lights etc. Here we
use the travel time to evaluate the cost of route.
To calculate the average travel time, we use the function
provided by [15]:
Tl = T0(1 + k1(
ql
qmax)k2
)
where l is the level of service which describes the traffic
density of a road. k1 and k2 are dimensionless parameters
given by the original paper.
C. Speed incentive
This incentive is most largely discussed in other lane-
changing model[4] [8]. In microscopic scenario, drivers use
surrounding cars to estimate their potential gain if they
execute a lane-changing. A car-following model is inte-
grated to calculate the longitudinal acceleration and expected
velocity. The desired velocity which reflects the driver’s
aggressiveness is took into account by the car-following
equations. The current speed to a large extent is decide by
the head vehicle. It can be calculated by IDM equation:
V = VIDM = V + a(1− (vα
v0
)β − ( s
∗
sα
)2)
A driver change lane for a speed gain tend to be adventitious
and aggressive, FVDM is more suitable to estimate his
expected speed
V = VOVM = V1 + V2tanh(C1(s− lc) C2)
Full Velocity Difference Model should integrated as un-
derlying model instead of IDM in the agents which are
aggressive because they act more adventitiously with a
pursuit of optimal velocity.
D. Courtesy incentive
Some cars with politeness attributes may give way to the
following blocked cars by changing lane. Or in some ramp-
on situations, they change lane to give more space for others
vehicles facing a mandatory lane-changing. Altruism takes
more attention at others’ benefits. The closer they are to the
merging intersection, the greater the probability that they will
give way.
Two cases are specified:
1. The ego velocity is slower than the average velocity
of the current lane. Altruism driver may give way to the
following car to make them not to be blocked.
After the end of the lane change, the current followers
and new followers will both a new speed V˜o and V˜n. Where
V˜o is the new velocity of old successor, and V˜n is the new
velocity of new successor.These two velocities are estimated
by a car-following model.
A =
|vs − vs desired| − |v˜s − vs desired|
|vs − vs desired| +
|vs − vs desired| − |v˜s − vs desired|
|vs − vs desired|
2. More closer to a on-ramp or off-ramp scenarios, more
possible drivers who change to the inner lane unless their
route are bound to the current lane. This scenario can also
be also considered as the first one. While other vehicles are
trying to merge into the lane of ego-vehicle, we can regard
these vehicles as our related vehicles, our courtesy incentive
is committed to make related car have the velocity closer to
desired. Thus the courtesy gain can be generalized as:
A =
∑ |vr − vr desired| − |v˜r − vr desired|
|vr − vr desired|
Where the vr is the velocity of each vehicle related to ego-
vehicle. This cost can present the extent not to hinder others
vehicle in the road.
E. Comfort incentive
People would have anxiety about traffic accidents if they
change lane in a congested traffic condition. As to a driver,
lane change behaviour cost him so much attention which
makes him nervous. In traditional motion planning algorithm,
people use the jerk and yaw rate to calculate the comfort.
These parameters can only demonstrate the passengers’ com-
fort instead of drivers’.
Drivers’ comfort is much more related to the average
time headway of the target lane. If the time headway is
long enough, drivers don’t need to pay attention at the
accepted gap distance. Conversely, under a traffic whose
average headway is short, people have to synchronize their
motion with the target lane. Once the headway is less than a
threshold, drivers have to attempt to cut in the target lane
by adjusting their planned path again and again and do
cooperative planning with the successor driver. This progress
can sharply augment the drivers’ tension. As less average
time headway is, more the times cooperate other vehicles
are. And the difficulty of manipulation in the lane change
will increase with the decrease of time headway. We suppose
comfort cost of lane-changing:
J = −K ∗ T−βh
where Th is the average of time headway of the target lane.
During the combination by multiple criteria decision making,
the parameter K can be retrieved out and integrated into the
weighting coefficients.
Comfort cost is aimed to mimic the drivers who has an
inattentive driving style or someone tired. They don’t care
too much about the time cost and would like to make driving
as relax as possible.
F. safety criteria
Safety criteria refers to the gap acceptance for a lane-
changing behaviour. The critical gap distance can varies
by several parameters [16] in different traffic condition. To
simplify, we regard a gap distance is acceptable once if the
time-to-collision between the new follower and ego car is
greater than a threshold Tth.
In traditional probabilistic lane-changing model. The lane-
changing behaviour is model as a decision tree and gap
acceptance is always in the lowest layer. This is also similar
in MOBIL, it firstly considered incentive is also acceleration
gain and then the safety criteria.
We also regard safe criteria as a temporary condition
instead of an incentive. Once drivers make a lane-changing
decision, he should notice the gap on the target lane. If
the gap distance is not acceptable for a totally safe lane-
changing, they should synchronize with the vehicles of target
lane or keep waiting.
G. Combine Criteria with driving style
MCDM is one of the most widely used decision method-
ologies in engineering, technology, science and management
and business. In MCDM domain, several families of combi-
nation strategy are proposed. We choose linear combination
strategy due to a complex formulation, such as exponential
relation[17], will sharply increase the difficulty of parame-
ters’ calibration.
Different drivers have different evaluation standard and our
criteria policies so highly related to driving style that these
weighs are the interface to mimic different kind of driving
style. For example, a greater weight of routing incentive
indicates the driver has preference of time saving. And the
agent which pay more attention at speed gain appears more
aggressive in urban traffic environment.
Driving style concerns the way a driver chooses to drive,
and depends on physical and emotional conditions of the
driver while driving. Driving style and driving skill can
be assumed as the fundamental factor of different driv-
ing behaviours [18]. They might be able to illustrate the
behaviour differences of one driver from another in the
same vehicle in the same situations. It both influences the
car-following behaviour [19] and particularly for the lane-
changing behaviour.
The classification of driving style and its impacts are stud-
ied in [9] [20]. Conservative behaviour could be categorized
as safe driving style, they hardly pursuit a irregular speed
or overtake other vehicles. Aggressive driving style seems to
have the opposite characteristics. We can give a larger desired
velocity and heavier weights of speed incentive into these
agents. Inattentive driving style indicates regular inattention
to driving actions and necessary observations to complete
the driving task. Driver fatigue and driver distraction could
result their inattention [21]. In practice, these people pre-
fer to follow their custom or original route and are not
willing to make then nervous. Thus we can augment the
comfort incentive weights to emulate inattentive style. As to
the interaction between vehicles, drivers’ characters can be
regarded egoism, altruism between the two. The coefficient
of courtesy can present how much the driver cares about the
others’ benefits. As we discussed previously, people change
to asymmetric lane with a possibility that they might change
their route. Thus for each lane-changing behaviour, we have
three possible results:
• Keep on the current lane Co.
• Change lane and get back timely Co, which can be
viewed as overtaking.
• Change both lane and routing path Ccr.
In the case that the target lane is symmetric to the current,
routing cost are the same because they have no sign of
changing the original route (symmetric lanes lead to the same
section).
TABLE I
DIFFERENT COSTS IN ALL POSSIBLE CASES
Cases Co Co Ccr
Possibility − Pback 1− Pback
Routing T (S, V ) T (S, V˜ ) T (S˜, V˜ )
Speed V V˜ V˜
Courtesy
∑
Vr
∑
V˜r
∑
V˜r
Comfort 0 J˜ + J J˜
Symbols with a tilde means the resulting cost after a lane-changing.
The expectation of the lane-changing gain is:
C = p ∗ Ccl + (1− p) ∗ Ccr − Co
As these cost criteria has different scale. We use the earning
rate to describe the attractiveness of lane-changing.
Y =
C
Co
We can combine these earning yields linearly:
G =
∑
µiYi
The total earning yield determines the desired degree of lane-
changing. Should note that the weights of each incentive
reflect the driving style of a driver. They are not bounded
to a fixed set but we can adjust them to achieve different
preference of a driver. Once combined earning yields G >
threshold, the robot car is supposed to take a lane-changing
action.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we discuss the model calibration and val-
idation. Some details of model implementation, calibration
setup, and data are described, and the results are given.
A. Data
Our traffic flow data is collected by drones which have
bird-view perspective. All vehicles’ position, velocity and
acceleration can be assumed accurate. And the locations of
all scenarios covered lots of different cities in the US and
in China. Different traffic conditions and scenarios, such as
highway and downtown, are also included. Local maps with
high definition are also built to get routing information.
B. Implementation
A high-definition map framework Lanelet2[22] is used to
load map information and generate all possible routing path.
A real-time route recommendation system is implemented to
simulator the navigation system in each car, it collects traffic
info and provides the drivers travel time of different routing
path. The platform is self-developed simulator, it can not
only load real car’s trajectory in real-time to calibrate our
model but also generate robot cars to test the validity of
our model. A renderer based on Unreal Engine 4 is used
to visualize the result. In validation part, we generate robot
agents from random entrance of our map and each agent
randomly choose a destination(exit in our map). The time
gap of generation varies according to time arrival model [23].
These robot agents are equipped with different car-following
model as we discussed previously.
C. Calibration of parameters
In the past studies of calibration, Maximum likelihood
Method and RMSE are widely used to find the optimal
parameters of the model[24]. In these methods, calibration
is aimed to find the optimal parameters for minimizing the
error. Here we use logistic regression to find out two set
of parameters, one for aggressive drivers and another for
conservative.
In our experiments, we firstly collected all cases drivers
change to an asymmetric lane. Some of them back to their
original lane, which means they change lane for overtak-
ing(speed incentive). Others’ behaviour were categorized as
route change. Thus we can calibrate out the probability of
back Pb with α = 0.058.
Then for each agent of our data, we can obtain their lane-
changing interest as
w = Aµ1 +Bµ2 + C(β)µ3 +Dµ4
where A, B, D are constants which are calculated from data,
only C is related to the parameter β. Thus we have only
5 parameters to calibrate. Additionally, a sigmoid function
h(w) = 1
1+e(−w) is applied to approach the lane-changing
probability. We use 1 for the vehicle changed their lane and
0 for the others. Thus we can form our logistic regression
cost as:
Cost(h(w), y) = −y log h(w)− (1− y)log(h(w))
Calibration consists of nding these values for the param-
eters, which minimize the logistic regression error J.
J =
∑
(Cost)
N
where N is the total number of vehicles in our dataset. We
use 23 of our data to calibrate and the remaining data to test
the validation.
In fact, real drivers have distinguishing driving style as
we discussed previously. Thus a set of fixed parameters
is never enough to describe different people’s behaviour.
Thus we selected aggressive vehicles out, then calibrated
them separately. The ratio between the aggressive drivers
and conservative drivers is about 1 to 7.4. The result of
calibration is showed as follows. Then we use these two
set of weights in our simulator which displayed in the next
subsection, the result shows our traffic flow generated are
plausible for the macroscopic lane-changing probability.
TABLE II
OPTIMAL PARAMETERS
Parameters Aggressive Conservative
α 0.058 0.058
β 1.1 2.3
µ1 1.26 0.44
µ2 0.58 0.41
µ3 0.03 0.09
µ4 0.61 1.72
One of the great advantages of our model is the variable
tuning parameters can produce totally different driving style
in real world.
D. Result
we tested our model in two scenarios, highway and urban
environment. The result shows in highway whose traffic
density is low and the route change cost is relatively very
high so that few driver tend to change their original route. In
this case, our model has similar performance with other well-
know lane-changing model, such as MOBIL [4].However
in urban environment, the result of our model shows the
lane-changing rate in different traffic density fits well the
observation of our dataset. [25]. MOBIL doesn’n work well
because it has to keep in right route.
The lane-changing rate is then given by:
r(ρ) =
n
4x4t
Additionally, the number of lane-changing increase sharply
while we augment the weight of route change incentive.
This result is more in line with our expectations. Once the
traffic is congested, people tend to change their original
route for reducing the travel time. And in the future, more
incentives are took into account, driving behaviour of a robot
car could be more realistic and diverse. We would like to
make the robot agents more intelligent that they can adjust
their behaviour according traffic condition.
VI. CONCLUSION
A methodology of building lane change model was pro-
posed, the lane-changing decision lies on the drivers’ own
incentives. Within multiple-criteria, the combination of in-
centives can easily realized and convenient to mimic different
Fig. 2. The experiment results demonstrates our model can produce similar
lane-changing rates with MOBIL in highway.
Fig. 3. In urban environment, our model can produce more plausible lane-
changing rates which are similar to the real data.
chauffeur type by changing the strategy. The different driving
styles are discussed and realised by tuning weights between
different incentives. And different car-following models are
integrated to simulate longitudinal motion. Each incentive
based cost evaluation function are formalized and calibrated
by real data. Validation shows the correspondence between
driving style and lane-changing behaviour.
Our modbel can represent a more abundant and unex-
pected lane changing behavior with different preferences of
incentives. And compared with artificial intelligence-based
model, our model has more flexible controllability due to we
can adjust the weights in multiple-criteria decision making.
The model was calibrated and validated in both free-flow and
congested urban traffic conditions. Furthermore, more other
incentives can be took into account to create more various
driving behaviours.
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